23rd May 2020
Kuwait-based think tank Reconnaissance Research interviewed several Middle East scholars about the political ramifications of the coronavirus pandemic throughout the region. The experts, Courtney Freer, Research Fellow at the Middle East Centre of the London School of Economics Alexey Khlebnikov, Middle East expert at The Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), and various staff from the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington (AGSIW) give their thoughts on various political topics below.
Will any Middle Eastern governments collapse?
Both Freer and Khlebnikov do not think it is likely that the pandemic itself will cause any states in the region to collapse. However, Freer stressed that governments may need to negotiate with their people more than in the past. This is already happening in Lebanon due to mass discontent over economic mismanagement. Full-scale uprisings, though unlikely, could take hold in countries where governments lack enough power to suppress unrest and to provide adequate assistance to the indigent. As for individual countries, she believes that Lebanon is particularly at risk given how the combination of a fiscal imbalance and the perception of corruption is stoking civil disorder. Egypt shares that combination, so it too could be prone to unrest. In the Gulf, Bahrain and Oman’s lack of large energy reserves could lead to greater pressure for job creation and general economic assistance.
Khlebnikov gave three reasons why we should not expect mass upheaval. First, Middle Eastern states had been grappling with major political and economic challenges before the pandemic and most adjusted to conditions on the ground. Iran is a case in point. Second, states in the poorest economic shape, like Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria, are so integrated in the regional economy that their collapse would incur severe consequences beyond the Middle East. Regional and extra-regional players would step in to prevent them from collapsing for that reason. Third, the youth bulge in the Middle East, where only five percent of the population is over the age of 65 (compared to 20 percent in the European Union), suggests that the morality rate there from coronavirus will be relatively low. Although political upheaval is unexpected, large numbers of refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey, as well as high youth unemployment rampant throughout the region, could serve as destabilizing factors.
What strategies could governments employ to mitigate the effects of high unemployment and a drastic decline in GDP?
According to Freer, one solution that has been proposed is a universal basic income. Yet exorbitant costs make this impractical in countries like Egypt. That leaves reopening economies as the obvious way to boost them again, though a second wave of the virus would probably reserve those gains. Her suggested solution is to prove cash grants to citizens until the economies can open more fully. This will provide enough financial assistance while ensuring that food and medicine are available and affordable to all.
The AGSIW also recommends macroeconomic strategies. Governments should raise spending as a means to minimize bankruptcies and mass redundancies. This is much more feasible in GCC countries than elsewhere. Current initiatives, such as Ghadan 21 in Abu Dhabi, are an immediate way forward. If states start to spend wisely right away, they will position themselves well for a later economic recovery. On a related note, GCC countries should step in to help their moribund private sectors by protecting their salaries. Once these states get the pandemic under control, a calibrated reopening will be the best solution for economies that are largely subject to external factors like energy demand, international transportation, and tourism.
Could the pandemic lead to greater political liberalization in the Arab world?
As Freer sees it, the pandemic will either fuel greater political liberalization or greater concentration of power by central governments. A test case is Lebanon, where people have placed greater demands on a government they consider incapable of protecting their interests amid a crisis. On the other hand, states with powerful military and security apparatuses and the means to continue employing them, can easily quash civil unrest in the name of protecting public safety due to the pandemic. A public health crisis gives cover to governments wanting to control their citizens more effectively.
The AGSIW shares the view that Lebanon – along with Iraq – will likely face increased strain. Furthermore, it is unclear how those countries will translate protest into effective reform. In the petroleum-rich Arab world, the public-health challenge and economic repercussions (namely declining oil prices) will leave the mostly authoritarian governments there preoccupied and thus unlikely to liberalize. Monarchies have so far done a job of meeting the pandemic’s challenges in ways that remind people of the advantages strong central government brings. Fiscal austerity may challenge this narrative, but these governments can channel a nationalist understanding of shared sacrifice. However less wealthy rentier states like Bahrain, Oman, and Jordan could have more difficulty in doing so successfully.
Should we think of the pandemic as the driver of political instability or rather as an accelerator of existing trends?
Khlebnikov considers the pandemic more of an accelerator. Yet seeing as the root causes of these problems remain unaddressed, the pandemic could trigger more instability worsening existing negative trends. Freer, too, sees it as an accelerator. Within the GCC in particular, the pandemic shows us what life will be like when hydrocarbon income is no longer reliable. These countries should be prompted to diversify their economies more quickly and more effectively. Beyond the GCC, demands that date back to 2010-2011 uprisings – trends of fighting corruption, wanting more transparent governance, wanting more equal distribution of state resources – could be accelerated.
The AGSIW is of the mindset that the pandemic has served as a catalyst for internal challenges while bringing to light issues that pre-existed the pandemic. This is the case in the Gulf, where economic diversification is more pressing than ever. What the pandemic may leave there is the building blocks for economic reforms that would have taken many years to implement under different circumstances. They also think it is too early to say how much political instability the pandemic will cause and observe that such concerns extent beyond the region. Vocal criticism on social media worldwide reveals how much anxiety the pandemic and governmental responses are generating in many, many countries.
Will the United States change any of its policies toward the region as a result of the pandemic?
All three do not envision major changes in US policy toward the region. Khlebnikov explains that since the 2008-2009 global economic crisis, Washington has dramatically increased its own oil output while dramatically decreasing its reliance on Middle Eastern oil. The Obama administration also made lessening US involvement in the region’s conflicts a centerpiece of its foreign policy, though the region remains an important military hub for the United States and its biggest arms customer. There is little evidence that the pandemic will lead to any changes in US policy. What may be of greater consequence is the upcoming presidential election.
The AGSIW is of a similar opinion that immediate policy change toward the Gulf is unlikely, especially since Washington’s relations with the GCC states are predominantly bilateral and thus independent of the worldwide struggle between protectionism and nationalism on one hand versus cooperation and globalization on the other. Even if former Vice President Joe Biden defeats incumbent President Trump this November, the material effect on Middle East policy is hard to foresee. Freer adds that a Trump victory will strengthen Washington’s resolve to protect US industry and promote its own energy production while weakening the priority of foreign aid and international bodies. Security policies will likely remain unchanged, especially given the administration’s commitment to containing Iran.